Is it possible to think strategically about succession in the public sector? The author reviews the private-sector succession literature for insight and analyzes the barriers in the public sector to taking succession seriously. With a case study based on her own experience managing succession at the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, she offers four strategies that a public sector leader who is committed to a strategic approach to succession might usefully employ.

In the public and private sectors alike, demand for change is the one constant. There is a loud call for leaders who can accommodate change personally and who can initiate and drive broad changes in their organizations. These demands make sense but raise a troubling issue. By relentlessly insisting on change, are we risking the loss of innovations recently realized? This is a particularly salient question for public-sector agencies, which are currently under attack from all sides.

In this article, I assert that while change must be on the agenda of any public agency for its very survival as well as for the public good, it is just as important to ensure that gains achieved in one administration be given a fair assessment and not be jettisoned, without review, to the god of change. Indeed, the importance of “sustained innovation”—essentially keeping change alive—is an increasing challenge for public agencies.

Will innovative programs created as a response to social problems be allowed to live out their “natural” lives, or will they be killed off before their time, independent of performance and outcomes? This issue is particularly acute in the transition between elected or appointed government officials—especially in a highly politicized environment that limits government’s capacity to continue efforts across administrations. Moreover, one critical tool available to the private sector, succession planning, is rarely used by public agencies because the executive’s fortunes are generally tied to a particular administration. Many public-sector leaders have devised strategies for continuing efforts across administrations. Some establish support beyond the government, for example, from the business community or other local “elites”; some obtain early bipartisan political support. Still others avoid program demise by identifying a champion linked to the incoming administration so as to have a voice “inside,” or by creating wide support within the agency (and other agencies) so that the new governor or mayor hears a consistent message. Finally, some administrators have succeeded in winning national recognition for their innovations so that discontinuing them is a perceived political risk.
As important as these approaches are, innovations also can be sustained by cabinet secretaries or agency heads engaging in succession planning, even though these people are as vulnerable to shifting political winds as their superiors. In fact, this level, where so much actual and potential innovation resides, represents a real opportunity for both preserving innovations and transferring them to subsequent regimes—provided the agency heads can, and will, extend their strategic vision beyond their own tenure. It is no longer sufficient to achieve change, difficult as it may be. The public-sector leader must learn to consider not only what can be but what will be, how what is achieved can be sustained. This requires future-oriented strategic thinking, which I argue must include attention to succession planning. Succession planning done well involves preparing the agency for a change in leadership, but it also includes assessing what has been valuable and how that can be preserved and transferred to the subsequent regime. It is this strategic, sustaining innovation aspect of succession planning that I focus on in this article.

First, I shall look at how research on succession in the private sector is both helpful and hindering for public-sector succession planning, especially in the realm of sustaining innovation. I will also examine the research that exists in the public sector and its relevance. I describe a series of constraints or barriers that must be overcome if succession is to be taken seriously in public-sector organizations.

I present a case study drawn from my experience as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, where I served for seven years and managed my succession in a way that enabled the innovations that had been put in place to be retained and further innovations based on these to be created. I discuss the four interconnected strategies devised to implement this succession and show how they can help both in overcoming barriers to taking succession seriously and in shaping the legacy of a public-sector organization.

**Succession and Succession Planning: A Brief Review of the Literature**

Most articles on succession and succession planning begin with a familiar lament: executive-level transition merits more attention than it gets in the literature (Rainey and Wechsler, 1988; Greenblatt, 1983; Gordon and Rosen, 1981; Austin and Gilmore, 1993). The relatively few authors who address the issue in the context of the public sector point out the even more serious gap on that side. The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), anticipating significant retirements in the Federal Senior Executive Service beginning in 1994, began a serious look at succession planning in the early 1990s (NAPA, 1992). The NAPA researchers also remarked on the lack of attention to public sector transitions. In an article written in 1993, although published later, Farquhar refers to the “rapidly expanding” literature on succession (Farquhar, 1996a), and in 1995, she edited a special edition of *Human Resource Management* on the topic of leadership transitions (Farquhar, 1995).

Both the problem in the public sector and its consequences have been described by Rainey and Wechsler (1988), who argue, “Whether one adopts a broad or more specific approach to organizational performance and productivity, effective transition management is essential to achieving positive results.” At the same time, the authors characterize executive transitions at all levels of government as “marked by serious deficiencies in preparation, orientation, and communication” (45). However, while noting that some research exists on the political management of transition at the presidential and gubernatorial levels, the authors do not make use of the broader literature on transition and executive succession that would help guide an analysis of transition and change at the agency level—particularly within, not between, administrations.

Various frameworks help conceptualize transition generally and the issues that surround it. The most useful begin before the actual succession event (Rainey and Wechsler, 1988; Greenblatt, 1983; Gordon and Rosen, 1981) and draw attention to what Rainey and Wechsler call the objective as well as subjective domains. But there is something missing even here. Greenblatt, for example, begins with what he terms the “anticipatory” stage but fails to capture the opportunity for a strategic view of this moment. Gordon and Rosen point out the need to attend to the time before the new leader arrives, but they still start with the new leader being chosen. Rainey and Wechsler describe transition as a major “strategy-influencing” event. This stops short of grasping transition’s full potential to make, not just influence, strategy. They write as if the departing leader has no role in shaping the transition.

Although the literature gives some attention to the person leaving (Kets de Vries, 1988), more is given to the new leader and his or her dilemmas (Gouldner, 1950; Greenblatt, 1983; Gilmore and Ronchi, 1995). In a particularly interesting article on leadership during interregna, Farquhar (1991) examines 43 Legal Service Corporations and analyzes the dynamics and impact of interim administrations.

Other research distinguishes the important dimensions in which cases differ, arguably the most significant being the reason for departure. Not all CEO successions are equally interesting for theorists. Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin. (1988) suggest that firings and voluntary departures offer the most meat because only then are real choices made; their work focuses on dismissals. Austin and Gilmore (1993) also highlight the importance of the reason for transition. They outline various reasons and cite previous works on each—retirement, term expiration, protest, reassignment, illness, or death—but select for case analysis the leader who chooses to move on to a new opportunity. They are especially helpful in suggesting explicit strategies the departing leader can use to manage the exit process. On the topic of contemplating one’s successor, Austin and Gilmore (1993, 52) comment, “It is striking how many executives have known that they will be leaving within a year or two and have not found a way either to focus on leadership succession or to expand the talent to help the organization cope with a change.”

This is the territory that my article attempts to plumb further: the voluntary decision to leave, planned and discussed in advance, as opposed to the sudden and traumatic leaving that Farquhar (1996) has written about and strategically framed.

**Taking Succession Seriously**

It is a serious matter that succession planning in the public sector, especially below the presidential level, has not, until recently, received much attention in the literature. However, a more critical
Succession planning, even in the private sector, has all too often been regarded as a replacement issue, not a strategic responsibility to be shared among the organization’s stakeholders.

issue is that it has not received much attention in the actual world of public service. This omission, in part, reflects the fact that leaders in the public sector have themselves not taken the issue of succession planning seriously, except for obvious concerns like elections and mandates. Doing strategic executive searches in the public sector is difficult, but that is a secondary factor. What is primary, I suggest, is changing public-sector culture so that focusing on succession and beyond becomes a hallmark of strategic leadership. The public-sector executive must begin to consider the end right at the beginning. The pull to get consumed by the demands of the present is strong but must be resisted. Creating a picture of what the leader wants to leave behind will actually help focus strategic choices as well as direct the leader’s attention to often overlooked strengths of the existing organization.

Public-sector leaders must surmount four types of barriers to taking succession seriously.
1. The leader’s reluctance to take up the succession “task”.
2. The assumption that succession issues are beyond the scope of the leader’s work.
3. Confusion about how the succession task should be framed—is it a matter of replacing oneself or of strategic “positioning”?
4. Lack of information about how to take up the task—how to plan for succession in the midst of a shifting political environment and given regulatory and political constraints.

Reluctance to “Deal” with Succession

In The Hero’s Farewell, a study of 50 prominent, retired, private-sector CEOs, Jeffrey Sonnenfeld (1988) discusses the “heroic self-concept of the departing leader” (3) as having a great influence on succession. Part of that self-concept is a “sense of heroic mission, a feeling that one has a unique role to fill and that only the hero is capable of carrying out the responsibilities of the job.” Sonnenfeld describes this attitude as “a barrier to the hero’s exit” (62). The greater the frustration with the heroic mission, and the more attached to the “heroic stature” of the office (another aspect of the heroic self-concept), the longer the CEOs Sonnenfeld studied stayed on the job (69).

Sonnenfeld groups CEO attitudes toward departure into four categories ranging from complete reluctance to willingness. Monarchs will not leave voluntarily and either die in office or are overthrown. Generals leave with great reluctance and then plot comebacks. Ambassadors leave gracefully and maintain amicable ties to their old organizations. Governors are pleased to serve only a limited time and then leave to do something else, maintaining little contact with the company. Monarchs and generals are clearly the most averse to acknowledging that the end draws nigh, and that factor affects the likelihood of a succession planning process occurring at all.

Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries (1988) also writes about the reluctance of corporate CEOs to tackle succession planning. As does Sonnenfeld, he focuses on the retirement-age CEO in the private sector who has to overcome the “hidden fears that plague us all” (57) to face stepping down.

Drawing direct parallels between public- and private-sector research on succession must be done carefully. Because the public sector has more short-term leaders than institution builders, one must take particular care in using the categories Sonnenfeld has illuminated. Nevertheless, the public sector has its share of reluctant-to-leave leaders. Certainly there are generals who believe, against all evidence, that there is some chance they can survive even an unfriendly transition of mayor or governor and thus are adverse to planning for a succession they do not want to happen. One also finds monarchs who are so imbued with their heroic sense of mission that they find it unthinkable that they ever would be forced to depart, no matter how unreasonable that belief may be. They therefore resist any attempt to broach the idea of succession, much less the planning for it.

The public sector has more than its fair share of governors, too. They seem an unlikely group on whom to depend for succession planning. Their investment in the agency is often minimal, as is the agency’s in them. The hope for planning must lie with the ambassadors, primarily by encouraging them to enlarge the scope of their vision to include the task of succession planning.

Assuming That Succession Is Beyond the Scope of the Leader’s Work

Beyond personal reluctance lies the power of the group norm. The public sector is focused on the here-and-now, and authority is thought to be given, not taken up.

Both the private and not-for-profit sectors have a clearer focus on the future. While the American business community is sometimes criticized for attending too much to the short term, as compared to the Japanese, for example, it is clear that there are mechanisms and institutionalized roles within the private sector to carry the perspective of the future: the stockholders and the board of directors, if not the CEO. Regina Herzlinger (1994) has argued that this focus on the future and “intergenerational equity” is among the most significant responsibilities of the not-for-profit board. These future-oriented mechanisms and roles are weak or nonexistent in the public sector, certainly at the agency level. Those outside government often call mayors and governors to task for budget wizardry that risks future crisis for present peace. If agency heads are held accountable at all, it is for their management of day-to-day problems, not their investment in the future.

The literature’s lack of attention to accountability for the future both underlines and reinforces the current situation. As more researchers turn their attention to this issue, it is possible there may be some shift in the public’s expectations. It is likely, though, that it will need some greater push than that. Teaching in both graduate school and executive education programs can have a great impact. Just as faculty try to set a standard that expects strategic leadership from public-sector executives and discourages a narrow focus on fighting fires, teachers can extend their understanding of what it takes to be strategic. Faculty can “raise the bar” (Zegans,
Confusion about the Succession "Frame"

Succession planning, even in the private sector, has all too often been regarded as a replacement issue, not a strategic responsibility to be shared among the organization's stakeholders (National Academy of Public Administration, 1992; Ket de Vries, 1988). That is, the intent is to replace X by Y, who has similar skills and training. What is missing is the link between the vacancy, or the forthcoming vacancy, and the organization's strategic needs (Gratton and Syrett, 1990)—particularly those related to preserving the innovations it has achieved.

Unprecedented global competition is forcing companies in the private sector to rethink succession planning in this strategic light, and those failing to do so are increasingly being "punished" by either the market or their competition, and usually by both. I would argue that the need for such strategic thinking is equally acute in the public sector, albeit motivated by different factors. The approach, however, seems long in coming. Although some states have moved toward a more strategic view of executive recruitment, this effort has generally been initiated only after the leader has resigned or been terminated.2

Difficulty of Managing Succession in a Turbulent Environment

There are actually two challenges to managing succession: technology and turbulence. Public-sector leaders have limited access to search technology and search firms; they may not even understand the steps in a strategic search process. The literature is thin on the subject and offers few clues about how to proceed. Turbulence now exists in all three sectors. It is not just in the public sector that strategic planning must somehow be both short- and long-term. The source of turbulence differs by sector (competition versus election, for example), but the swirling confused winds that each produces can make the process more complicated anywhere. What separates the sectors is their reaction to turbulence.

Public-sector leaders too often allow the turbulence to limit their scope of action ("there will be a new mayor so I have no control"), whereas private-sector leaders are expected to "manage" the turbulence ("how can we move into this new market and fast?"). Elections need not doom the process of executive succession. If the first three barriers could be overcome and leaders had the will—were expected to plan for succession and saw it as a strategic task—the technology could be acquired and the turbulence acknowledged but not succumbed to.

Keeping these barriers in mind, we turn to an example of how a public-sector succession can be managed successfully and how hard-won innovations can survive the transition.

Managing a Public-Sector Transition: A Case Study3

The New York City Department of Juvenile Justice was created as a separate executive-branch agency in 1979. I served as its commissioner for seven years, from 1983 to 1990. During my tenure, the department accomplished two major goals. We revitalized a bureaucracy that had originally been part of a "mega-agency" and had lost all sense of purpose and efficiency before being reincarnated as a separate department in 1979 (Gilmore and Schall, 1986). We developed a clear mission and role for juvenile detention. Overall, we created an innovative organization, and believed that sustaining our innovations and the impetus to innovate were critically important.4

The executive staff of the Juvenile Justice Department had become a team in Katzenbach and Smith's (1993) sense. We had moved from being preoccupied with handling an endless supply of short-term issues toward building the capacity for and the pattern of looking ahead. Crucial to this focus was creating the notion of case management as a way to make real our newly defined mission of custody and care and to explore its implications for the children we served and the staff attending to them. Although I was offered opportunities to leave the department early on, I determined that two additional goals had to be reached before I felt "finished" enough to depart. The first involved institutionalizing our case management program throughout the agency. The second was receiving final city approval of our plans to replace a much-maligned secure detention facility with two new, smaller, community-based facilities.

By early 1988, these goals were well on their way toward accomplishment, and I believed the time for new leadership was nearing. I discussed my role in the transition process with Tom Gilmore, an organizational consultant to the department and author of Making a Leadership Change (Gilmore, 1988). It is his thinking and framework that we owe much of the work that followed, beginning with a retreat, in the fall of 1988, for the executive staff.

Launching the "Finishing Up" Phase

During this midday retreat, we began by discussing how our group was currently faring and what work each unit in the agency would be undertaking in the next two years. Then, each executive staff member outlined what his or her own time horizon was likely to be, and how that did or did not dovetail with the work to be accomplished. In essence, we acknowledged we were launching a "finishing up" phase, with all that implied: pride in achievement, exhaustion from the effort, disappointment about unrealized goals, and full doses of the irritation and affection built up over the years. I announced my intention to leave at this time but did not actually leave for 18 months.

We then turned to issues of both legacy and succession: legacy to ensure that our innovations would survive and succession as a major strategy. As to succession, we determined that we preferred someone from our own ranks. By the end of the retreat, not only had we "chosen" our candidate, the assistant commissioner for secure detention, she had begun to see herself as a possible succes-

Public sector leaders too often allow the turbulence to
We were not looking for eternal life; rather, we hoped that the clues might somehow provoke new ideas to sustain our momentum and direction.

sor. But how could we ensure that our legacy would be preserved? We invented four questions for ourselves, which we attempted to address simultaneously during the retreat and for the next year and more. We saw these challenges, in fact, as a set of Russian dolls, each nested in another.

- How could we get our candidate appointed as the next commissioner of the Juvenile Justice Department?
- If this failed, how could we get someone else who would continue our innovations and our vision?
- If this too failed, and a nonsupporter was appointed, how could we keep successful innovations alive?
- If all else failed, could we leave a “treasure map” so a future supportive commissioner could rediscover what we had done?

We tackled these questions simultaneously by scenario-playing, by anticipating pitfalls, and by creating alternative paths—what Bardach (1977) calls the work of “dirty-minded implementors.” Our strategies are discussed below in reverse order from the list of questions.

Designing a Treasure Map

The idea was, if all else had failed, to provide the next supportive commissioner with a series of clues about our efforts—our treasures. We decided, for example, to leave behind the following:

- Traces of each of our innovative programs, rather than cutting any one (in the face of significant budget cuts) to spare the rest.
- At least one staff person each program so it could be fairly easily resurrected.
- A good written record in files and public documents about our accomplishments.
- Champions for each major initiative. More generally, we knew we were leaving behind a staff imbued with a vision of innovation and excellence.

Our support and acknowledgment of the staff’s good work had been a hallmark of our administration, and we counted on their enhanced capacity to carry forward much of the innovation.

We were not naive enough to believe that, if discovered, our treasures would get resurrected under the same names and exactly in the same way. That was not the goal. We were not looking for eternal life; rather, we hoped that the clues might somehow provoke new ideas to sustain our momentum and direction.

Keeping Successful Innovations Alive

The two new tactics we pursued were preparing people and “hardwiring” the system. We also took advantage of previous strategic decisions to help preserve our legacy of innovative programs.

Preparing People

By early 1989 the executive staff began identifying talent at the next level down within each unit. Determining the criteria for such identification was not a simple matter, however, and provoked heated debates about overall skills, vision, agency mission, managerial ability, and other factors. Nevertheless, we compiled a list of about 30 people and then assessed each person’s strengths and weaknesses and the likelihood of the individual’s staying on with the agency. We specified what each needed for professional development and began connecting her or him with appropriate opportunities—pledging that we would watch out for each other’s staff and help them along the way. From this review, for example, we drew upon the talent of a staff assistant with the potential of developing managerial capacity and targeted a heretofore overlooked senior operational manager for more cross-agency work and exposure to the overall system. As we grew to understand who would be leaving, we discussed who could be groomed to take over.

Compiling this list helped immensely in focusing our training resources. As we learned of various city-wide programs, for example, we referred to our list so people on it could be offered these opportunities.

Hardwiring

Some things in organizations have a life of their own; they go on against almost all efforts to change them. At the Juvenile Justice Department those things included the forms used to process kids. I remember two years into my tenure finding forms in use that predated the 1979 creation of the department as a separate agency. This infuriated me then. Later, it intrigued me. What about those forms made them survive despite our efforts to create new systems? They seemed almost like permanent fixtures of the agency; they were hardwired. In a deliberate effort to create an equivalent method with equal sticking power, we turned our attention to what we hoped might be our version of those old forms: the department’s newly developed case-management computer-tracking system. We put a great deal of energy into moving that ahead. We believed that if a system was in place, hardwired, which in effect systemized the case management of individual children and reported data, it would carry a great deal of weight. We knew that weight could easily become inertia: it would take an effort of significant proportion to shift away from it.

Our focus on hardwiring also extended to the department’s external relationships, particularly in the realm of oversight. “Blessed” with multiple agencies overseeing our work, we figured that if they became accustomed to receiving certain data, reported in certain ways, they would be likely to request that information and format subsequently and exert some pressure toward our case-management approach and system to receive it.

Strategic Decisions

Earlier, we had decided to run a community-based aftercare program ourselves rather than contract it out; doing so involved tremendous effort, including establishing new civil service positions. We felt that in an (inevitable) financial crisis, it would be easier for the city to cancel contracts than to authorize layoffs, and we were right. We experienced successive rounds of budget cuts but were able to hold on to at least a core of staff. Also, our intensive home-based program, Family Ties, an alternative to costly
Justice state

Managing that

Finding a Successor Who Would Continue Our Efforts

Because New York City was facing a mayoral campaign (between David Dinkins and Rudolph Giuliani) as we were devising our legacy and succession strategies, we designed scenarios for each candidate based on whom he might want as commissioner of the Juvenile Justice Department. We brainstormed a range of issues including values, ethnicity, and gender and considered people fitting various profiles. We wanted to be able to present a list of real candidates if someone asked—and to present that list even if no one did. We then went on to think about who would likely be influential in the new mayor's decision-making process and whether we knew them or knew someone who did.

Getting Our Candidate Appointed

David Dinkins was elected, and his approach to appointing commissioners was decentralized, bordering on the chaotic. Committees named for each agency were asked to interview candidates and make recommendations to the mayor. I knew the person chairing the Juvenile Justice group and talked with her directly. Along with others, our candidate was interviewed; she was recommended and ultimately selected to be the new commissioner.

Managing the Feelings

Although the decision to leave the Department of Juvenile Justice was strictly my own, and I strongly attempted to ensure that the transition was smooth, the process was hardly easy. Indeed, years after, when I began writing this article, I thought that I had announced my intention to leave six months prior to my departure—only after checking notes did I realize it actually had been 18 months. This confusion reflects the difficulties involved. There were issues of authority, over hiring, for example, and the natural tension each of us felt between being ready to move on and reluctant to leave. Managing one's own succession is not a simple affair, which is why, in the public and private sector, the issue of succession itself and the process of seeking a successor are so often badly handled.

Yet I believe that when a team has invested as much as we had in creating and innovating organization, the work is unfinished if you have not attempted to think strategically about its continuation. Today, the department's case-management system and the Aftercare and Family Ties programs are all in place, although reduced by budget cuts. While my successor remained committed to the agenda we had developed together, she took the agency in new directions with a focus on prevention. She remained at Juvenile Justice for four years and her successor has worked hard to keep the basic programs in place and move the agency forward.

Moving Forward

How can we persuade public-sector leaders to take up the task of succession? Sector does not matter when it comes to the leader's dark side; the wish to believe in one's own immortality and to stay in control (Kets de Vries, 1988) can be found in leaders across sectors. Although leaders in all sectors confront relentless demands on their time and energies, private-sector cultures work more powerfully to stress the need to plan ahead. We will have to cultivate that emphasis in the public sector if we seek it. We can begin by searching for stories or case examples of successful and strategic public-sector transitions. We can attempt to set the expectation through education, solidify it through public attention, and seek to attract ambassadors to the work of the public sector.

This is not the easiest of times to build a focus on the long term, however. There is a serious disconnect between the demands on, and expectations of, public-sector leaders and their lengths of stay. Perhaps the "connect" is all too clear: as citizens we ask a lot, offer little in terms of understanding and support (let alone compensation), blame easily, and reward infrequently. In any event, the average tenure of public-sector agency heads is less than two years. Given the impact of such a brief tenure on expected results, advice is being offered about how to shorten the learning curve or reach full speed more quickly. These observations, while well intentioned, seem inevitably to fall short. Public-sector leaders need to stay longer and focus more on the future to ensure the quality of government we need.

Democracies offer citizens an opportunity, through elections, to signal their preferences, and elected officials have the right to create new directions and change course. Yet both citizens and elected officials must avoid "change for change's sake." Not only can that attitude slide all too easily into simple-minded government-bashing, with the public increasingly losing respect for any government programs and any government worker; it also severely constrains government's capacity to go forward and build on the best of its efforts—in other words, its capacity to sustain innovation.

Both the public and those in the government need to learn to honor the past and build upon it. We must begin creating the expectation that the public sector can, and should, focus on the longer term. As I have suggested in this article, senior officials, whether elected or appointed, must not only think strategically during their tenure but also be oriented beyond their tenure. Developing the willingness and ability to devise an effective approach to succession planning is a crucial step in that process.

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Acknowledgment

The author wishes to thank Bob Behn and the participants in the 1994 Duke University Faculty Seminar on Organizational Innovation in State and Local Government, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, for their reactions and assistance in working through issues of public sector succession. Katherine Farquhar demonstrated extraordinary generosity in offering a thorough and thoughtful critique of an earlier version of this article. The comments of the anonymous reviewers are also very much appreciated. Finally, Tom Gilmore's earlier assistance and continuous support deserve acknowledgment here.

Notes

1. See Yin (1979) for an early discussion of the routinization of innovations.
2. In the early 1980s, the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation funded what was then the executive search firm of Isaacson, Ford, Webb to be available to governors looking for new commissioners of correction. And the National Governors Association, with funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, began a State Health Recruitment Center in the early 1990s that lasted no more than two years. Individual governors and mayors have turned to search firms from time to time, but most rely on a narrow pool of people they know.
3. This case is presented at least in part as a retrospective life story with attention to the actual organizational events, whether passage or cycles, in Yin's terms (Yin 1979) but also includes the feelings that accompany the organizational changes.
4. The Department of Juvenile Justice won the Ford Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Innovation Award in State and Local Government in 1986, the first year of the awards program, for its case-management program for at-risk youth. The department was also recognized in the Public Broadcasting System documentary, "Excellence in the Public Sector with Tom Peters." Additional program innovations included creating an Aftercare Program and adapting Home Builders to the juvenile justice system in a program we called Family Ties.

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